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Policies of lowering carbon demand may aggravate rather than alleviate climate change 
(green paradox). In a two-period three-country general equilibrium model with finite 
endowment of fossil fuel one country enforces an emissions cap in the first or second period. 
When that cap is tightened the extent of carbon leakage depends on the interaction of various 
parameters and elasticities. Conditions for the green paradox are specified. All determinants 
of carbon leakage resulting from tightening the first-period cap work in opposite direction 
when the second-period cap is tightened. Tightening the second-period cap does not 
necessarily lead to the green paradox. 
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 1 The problem
Growing scientiﬁc evidence (IPCC 2007) suggests that we cannot stabilize the world climate
at safe levels unless we substantially slow down the world emissions of greenhouse gases.
A number of countries have already increased their eﬀorts to curb emissions, notably the
(Annex 1) countries that committed to emissions reductions in the Kyoto Protocol. Yet
many small and large countries still refrain from taking (strong) action. That raises the
question what the chances are of a subset of abating countries to bring down world emissions
to safe levels.
We will address this issue by restricting our focus on carbon dioxide that is the most
important greenhouse gas. Carbon dioxide emissions (emissions, for short) are generated
almost in proportion to burning fossil energy resources (fossil fuel, for short) which are still
the dominant source of energy consumption. Any national policy of curbing emissions is
bound to raise domestic energy costs and thus enables ﬁrms in non-abating countries to
expand. For that reason, the eﬀort of abating countries will be oﬀset to some extent by
increasing emissions in non-abating countries. That phenomenon has come to be known as
carbon leakage. Since it is the aggregate world emissions that determine the damage from
climate change, the net emissions cutback by a group of abating countries is smaller than
that group’s gross emissions reductions. It is conceivable that the induced emissions increase
in non-abating countries is equal to or even greater than the gross emissions reduction
achieved by the group of abating countries. The extreme case in which demand-reducing
measures of abating countries increase rather than reduce aggregate world emissions, as
compared to their level in the absence of abatement eﬀorts, is referred to as green paradox
by Sinn (2008).
High rates of carbon leakage would cast serious doubt on the eﬀectiveness of any
subglobal abatement strategy as represented, e.g., by the Kyoto approach. Since it is
unclear at present whether an eﬀective post-Kyoto agreement will be reached over the next
years mandating strong action for all major carbon emitting countries, it is important to
have a good understanding of the key mechanisms underlying carbon leakage.
The bulk of research on carbon leakage has been carried out in (large-scale) CGE
analyses. According to Burniaux and Martins (2000) the estimates of such models range
from leakage rates of 20% to lower bound estimates of 2% to 5%. The IPCC (2007)
estimates the leakage eﬀect in about the same range for the climate policy based on the
Kyoto Protocol. Burniaux and Martins (2000) conclude from their extensive sensitivity
analysis (ibidem, p. 13) that "... carbon leakages are small for the range of parameters
most frequently quoted in the literature ...", and they emphasize that this assessment
1strongly relies on the assumption that the supply of coal is fairly elastic over the medium
term. Felder and Rutherford (1993), Paltsev (2001), Babiker (2005), Gerlagh and Kuik
(2007), Marschinski et al. (2008) and others provide further informative insights into various
channels and determinants of carbon leakage.
The prevailing view of relatively modest leakage rates is challenged by a line of research
in the area of (intertemporal) theory of nonrenewable natural resources that takes as its
point of departure an extraction path of fossil fuel that is suboptimally steep in laissez-
faire e.g. because of the global warming externality (Sinn 1982; Sinclair 1994; Hoel and
Kverndokk 1996; Farzin 1996; Rubio and Escriche 2001; Sinn 2008). In models that diﬀer
with respect to their assumptions on market power and strategic behavior the question is
addressed as to what the potential is of various kinds of taxation to restore eﬃciency by
ﬂattening the extraction path. Under various qualiﬁcations a major though not undisputed
result is that carbon taxes tend to have little impact on the time proﬁle of extraction and
that the extraction path is steepened if tax rates rise in time. Accordingly, Sinn’s (2008,
p. 360) verdict is that ”... if suppliers feel threatened by a gradual greening of (demand-
reducing) policies in the Kyoto countries that would damage their future prices; they will
extract their stocks more rapidly, thus accelerating global warming” (Sinn 2008, p. 360).
From this perspective the prevailing view on the eﬀectiveness of demand-reducing policies
is ﬂawed because the public and academic discourse (including the Stern Review 2006) has
largely neglected the close link between the economics of global change and the economics
of non-renewable resources and has therefore failed to account for the supply side of the
problem in an appropriate way.
The supply-side-literature aggregates all fossil-fuel consuming countries into a single
country which amounts to presupposing full cooperation of all countries. Yet the very
notion of carbon leakage as introduced above requires distinguishing abating and non-
abating countries since carbon emissions leak from the former to the latter, after all.1 We
are not aware of analytical studies that model intertemporal wealth maximizing resource
supply and consider, at the same time, the leakage of carbon from the group of abating
countries to non-abating countries.
The present paper aims at examining the determinants of carbon leakage and the
green paradox in a simple two-period general-equilibrium model that explicitly considers
the intertemporal use of fossil fuel as a non-renewable resource in ﬁnite supply. We map the
1This is not to say that approaches focusing on global centralized emissions control policies are irrelevant
for the topic of the present paper. A green paradox can certainly be said to occur when a global policy
intending to ﬂatten the extraction path results in steepening it. For the link between that literature and
the present paper see also Section 4.0.
2prevailing real-world scenario in a stylized way by constructing a three-country economy
consisting of a fossil-fuel exporting country, an abating country and a non-abating country.
The abating country represents the coalition of countries that have committed to observe
binding national emissions caps à la Kyoto and the non-abating country stands for the
rest of the world (except the fuel exporting countries) assumed to refrain from taking
(strong) action to curb emissions. To keep a clear focus on leakage, we do not deal with
environmental damage from carbon emissions and optimal corrective policies.
In that general equilibrium framework we explore the conditions for carbon leakage
and the green paradox. We investigate by means of comparative static analysis how much
carbon leaks into the non-abating country when the abating country tightens its emissions
cap and when the resource supplier follows a (simpliﬁed) Hotelling rule. We ﬁnd that
carbon leakage is unavoidable and the green paradox may occur depending on the interplay
of demand conditions, in particular the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in demand,
and supply conditions, especially the price elasticities of fuel demand. There are parameter
constellations under which the green paradox may occur when the emissions constraint
is tightened either in the ﬁrst or in the second period. The proposition which ties the
green paradox to the ”gradual greening of (demand-reducing) policies” therefore does not
receive unambiguous support from our analysis.2 When more countries join the coalition of
abating countries less carbon tends to leak into the non-abating countries. The incidence
of reducing emissions (= tightening the emissions cap) either in the ﬁrst or in the second
period is shown to be mirror-symmetric: Essentially, parameter constellations under which
the green paradox is avoided, when the ﬁrst-period cap is tightened, tend to generate a
green paradox, when the second-period cap is tightened, and vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 investigates
the determinants of carbon leakage and the green paradox when the abating country tight-
ens its ﬁrst-period emissions cap. Section 4 explores the eﬀects of enlarging the group of
abating countries. In Section 5 the same issues as in Section 3 are addressed for the case
that the abating country tightens its second-period emissions cap. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a two-period model with three (groups of) countries A, N and F, where A is the
abating country, N is the non-abating country and F is the fossil-fuel exporting country.
2See also Ulph and Ulph (1994) who show in a diﬀerent analytical framework that the optimal carbon
tax need not necessarily be falling.
3Except for their carbon emissions control (see below) the economies of the countries A
and N are alike. In period t = 1,2 each country i = A,N produces the output xs
it of the





i (eit) i = A,N. (1)
The countries A and N import all fossil fuel from country F that is endowed with a stock
of fossil fuel, ¯ e. Country F does not produce good X but rather buys that good from the
countries A and N paying for those imports with the revenues from exporting fossil fuel.
The representative consumer of country i derives utility from consumption xi1 in
period 1 and from xi2 in period 2 according to the intertemporal utility function
ui = U
i (xi1,xi2) ≡ U (xi1,xi2) i = A,F,N, (2)
which is increasing in both arguments and quasi-concave. The elasticity of intertemporal
















  ∈ [0,∞[,
is a property of the utility function that will turn out to play an important role in the
subsequent analysis.
In each period, good X and fossil fuel are traded on perfectly competitive world
markets (comprising all three countries) at prices pxt and pet, respectively. For t = 1,2 the





Nt = xAt + xNt + xFt, (3)
eFt = eAt + eNt, (4)
where eFt is the fossil fuel supply of country F in period t. Obviously, the supplies eFt for
t = 1,2 need to satisfy the intertemporal constraint
¯ e = eF1 + eF2. (5)
The countries A and N diﬀer with respect to their carbon emissions regulation. We
envisage an international agreement on reducing carbon emissions like the Kyoto protocol
that does not encompass all countries in the world. Country N represents the group of
3In (1) the superscript s indicates quantities supplied. Upper case letters denote functions and subscripts
attached to them indicate ﬁrst partial derivatives.
4fuel-consuming countries that do not participate in the agreement and hence do not con-
strain their carbon emissions at all.4 Country A then represents the group of participating
countries. Denote by ¯ eAt the emissions cap country A imposes in period t = 1,2. Country
A may cap its emissions either in both periods or in one of the periods only. At present
there is already a group of countries capping their emissions. Therefore, we will restrict our
focus on the scenarios (i) where a binding cap ¯ eA1 exists but no cap in period 2, i.e.
eA1 ≤ ¯ eA1 and eA2 unconstrained, (6a)
or (ii) where binding caps exist in both periods, i.e.
eA1 ≤ ¯ eA1 and eA2 ≤ ¯ eA2. (6b)
The caps can either be imposed directly, or through a tax-and-standard scheme or through
an emissions trading system. Given the high level of abstraction of our model all these
policies of implementing an emissions cap are equivalent. To simplify the exposition we
refer to emissions trading only in the subsequent analysis assuming that the emissions
permits are auctioned at some price πt,t = 1,2, that is determined endogenously.
























where π2 ≡ 0 if (6a) applies. In (7) - (9) we have not discounted the second-period proﬁts,
because in the absence of capital investment the market rate of interest is zero. Moreover,
the ﬁrm in country F does not incur any extraction costs. While this assumption is not
realistic5 it is not central for the qualitative conclusions to be derived.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of maximizing (7), (8) and (9) read, respectively,
π1 = px1X
A
eA1 − pe1 > 0 and px2X
A
eA2 = pe2, (10)
px1X
N
eN1 = pe1 and px2X
N
eN2 = pe2, (11)
pe1 = pe2. (12)
4When climate is treated as a global public good, the business-as-usual scenario is commonly modeled as
a Nash equilibrium where each country’s emissions-reduction policy is the best reply to the other countries’
abatement eﬀorts. For the resultant ”free-rider leakage” in such an approach see e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993). In our model governments do not play Nash. Instead they do or do not take action depending on
their (non)commitment in a Kyoto-type international agreement.
5In fact, zero extraction costs tend to favor carbon leakage because it makes the supply of fossil fuel
perfectly elastic. For the consideration of stock-dependent extraction costs see Sinn (2008).
5We assume π1 > 0 in (10) because we consider an emissions cap ¯ eA1 that is strictly binding
in the relevant range of equilibrium prices.6 As noted above, π2 ≡ 0 if (6a) applies and
π2 > 0 if the relevant constraints are given by (6b). In case of pe1  = pe2 the fossil-fuel
selling ﬁrm would sell all fossil fuel either in the ﬁrst or in the second period generating an
excess demand in that period in which its supply is zero. Hence equation (11) represents
a necessary (arbitrage) condition for equilibrium.7 In equilibrium, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between selling its fossil fuel in period 1 or 2.





= ΠA∗ + π1¯ eA1








fori = A,F,N. (14)
We have thus completed the description of the model and are ready for studying the
impact of policy changes in country A. In the next Section 3 we will consider the policy
scenario (6a) and investigate the allocative eﬀects when country A tightens its emissions
cap ¯ eA1 (d¯ eA1 < 0). Section 4 explores the eﬀects of enlarging the group of abating countries
and after that we will turn to the scenario (6b) in Section 5 and investigate the impact of
the policy changes (d¯ eA1 < 0 and d¯ eA2 = 0) as well as (d¯ eA1 = 0 and d¯ eA2 < 0).
3 Tightening the emissions cap in the ﬁrst period
Consider a competitive equilibrium in the three-country model (1) - (5), (6a), (7) - (14) in
which the constraint (6a) is strictly binding and suppose the emissions cap ¯ eA1 is tightened:9
ˆ ¯ eA1 :=
d¯ eA1
¯ eA1 < 0. Carbon leakage is said to occur if ˆ eN1/ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0. Carbon leakage is
particularly severe, if the reduction of carbon emissions in country A is overcompensated
by the (induced) increase in carbon emissions in country N, i.e. if ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0. In such
6Suﬃcient for (10) and (11) are the regularity conditions lim
ejt→0
Xj
ejt = ∞ and lim
ejt→∞Xj
ejt = 0 for j = A,N
and t = 1,2 which we assume to hold.
7The Hotelling rule requires the market rate of interest to equal the rate of increase in the price of the
natural resource. Since in our model the market rate of interest is zero by assumption, (12) is a simpliﬁed
version of the Hotelling rule.
8In (12) Πi∗ is the maximum proﬁt of the ﬁrm in country i. The budget constraints can be rearranged to
 
t [pxt (xs
it − xit) − peteit] for i = A,N and
 
t (peteFt − pxtxFt) = 0 which turn out to be the countries’
intertemporal trade balances.
9Throughout the paper the ’hat variables’ are deﬁned as ˆ y = dy/y.
6a situation tightening the emissions control in country A increases total carbon emissions
in period 1, which is called ’green (policy) paradox’. Country A’s eﬀort of ﬁghting global
warming actually turns out to promote global warming.10
We aim at investigating the conditions under which the green paradox occurs in the
analytical framework developed in Section 2. For that purpose we ﬁrst determine the
displacement eﬀect of ˆ ¯ eA1  = 0 on the intertemporal market for fossil fuel:11,12
ˆ eF1   eF1 = ¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1       
[1]
−
pe1eN1 |ηN1| ¯ eA1
γp − pe1eN1ηN1       
[2]
ˆ ¯ eA1 −
γpeN1 |ηN1|















< 0 is country N′s price elasticity of demand for fossil fuel in
period 1 and γp := −pe1(eA2ηA2 + eN2ηN2) > 0. We are in the position to show
Proposition 1. ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0, ˆ pe1/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0 and deF1/d¯ eA1 < 1 if the utility function
is homothetic.13
Proof. Contrary to the ascertion suppose that ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0. In that case (15b) yields




























(ˆ eA2eA2 + ˆ eN2eN2), (17)






























N2)/ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0 and hence ˆ qs/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0 from (19). Consider







i = σiˆ px2 fori = A,F,N. (20)
10In view of (5) we have sign (ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA1) = −sign(ˆ eF2/ˆ ¯ eA1). As the goal of climate policy is to delay the
consumption of fossil fuel, tightening the emissions cap ˆ ¯ eA1 promotes that goal only if ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0.
11(15a) is derived in the Appendix.
12Throughout the rest of the paper good X in peroid 1 is chosen as numeraire (px ≡ 1).
13A function is homothetic, if it can be written as an increasing transform of a linear homogeneous
function. The class of homothetic functions encompases CES functions, Leontief functions, and isoelastic
functions. Isoelastic utility functions (see (27) below) are often applied in empirical studies and, e.g., in
the Stern review (2006).
7Since all utility functions are assumed to be identical we have σi = σ and qd
i = qd for
i = A,F,N. Under this condition (20) implies ˆ qd/ˆ ¯ eA1 = σ   (ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1) < 0 for ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0.
(ˆ qs − ˆ qd)/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0 follows. However, (ˆ qs − ˆ qd)/ˆ ¯ eA1 = 0 is a necessary equilibrium condition.
This contradiction proves the claim ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0. ˆ pe1/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0 is straightforward from
ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0 and (A30), and deF1/d¯ eA1 < 1 follows from (15b).  
Proposition 1 conveys the important messages that if country A tightens its ﬁrst-
period emissions cap the world market price of fossil fuel (in terms of ﬁrst-period consump-
tion) falls and ﬁrst-period consumption becomes more expensive relative to second-period
consumption.14 For both reasons it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrms in country N to expand their
output and hence their fossil fuel consumption.
Equation (15a) speciﬁes the ﬁrst-period emissions reduction induced by tightening
the cap ¯ eA1 (ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0). [1] is the (partial) direct eﬀect which would imply zero leakage
in the absence of market adjustments. The terms [2] and [3] represent leakage eﬀects. [2]
captures the increase in eF1 caused by the drop in pe1 if px2 is (hypothetically) kept constant.
The increase in eF1 due to [2] is the smaller the more price elastic the fuel demand of the
countries A and N are in period 2 (γp larger) and the more price elastic the fuel demand
of country N is in period 1 (|ηN1| larger). Observe that the eﬀect [2] generates carbon
leakage but never leads to the green paradox since the term
γp
γp−pe1eN1ηN1 in (15b) is positive
but less than one. However, the eﬀect [3] exacerbates carbon leakage (since ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0)
and creates the possibility of the green paradox which will then occur if and only if the
eﬀect [3] is suﬃciently strong. As response to ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0, the increase in eF1 due to [3] is
larger the more price elastic the aggregate fuel demand is in period 2 (γp larger), the more
price elastic the fuel demand of country N is in period 1 (|ηN1| larger), and the greater
is ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1. The role of eﬀect [3] is to equilibrate the markets for the consumption good in
both periods while maintaining the equilibrium in the markets for fossil fuel through an
appropriate reduction in pe1. This observation highlights that the eﬀect [3] emerges in our
model because it contains a full set of competitive (future) markets all of which are required
to clear.
The eﬀects of tightening the cap ¯ eA1 are illustrated in Figure 1. Let AG be the
ﬁrst-period fuel demand curve of country A when no cap is applied and let ABCD be the
aggregate ﬁrst-period demand curve (where country N’s demand is horizontally added to
country A’s demand). The line ACS is the aggregate ﬁrst-period demand for fossil fuel
when country A’s emissions cap is ¯ e0
A1. With that cap in place, aggregate demand is still
unconstrained in the segment ABC. The segment CD, however, is now replaced by the
14This observation is clearly equivalent to the statement that second-period consumption becomes less


























pe1,pe1 + π1 pe2
Figure 1: Impact of tightening the emissions cap in period 1
line CS. For fossil-fuel prices less than 01T country A’s fuel demand is constant at ¯ e0
A1
while country N’s demand expands with sinking prices along CS.
According to (10) and (11) the aggregate second-period demand for fossil fuel can be
depicted in Figure 1 only for some predetermined price px2. Suppose, p0
x2 is the equilibrium
value of px2 when country A has ﬁxed the emissions cap ¯ e0
A1 and let LM represent the ag-
gregate fuel demand in period 2 when px2 = p0
x2 prevails and when second-period emissions
are not capped. According to (12) point E in Figure 1 then characterizes the equilibria in
the periods 1 and 2 of the world markets for fossil fuel where p0
e1 = p0
e2 = NE.
Suppose now country A tightens its emissions cap from ¯ e0
A1 to ¯ e′
A1, ¯ e′
A1 < ¯ e0
A1. As
a consequence, the curve of the ﬁrst-period aggregate fuel demand shifts from ACS to
ABF. In Figure 1, the emissions reduction ¯ e0
A1 − ¯ e′
A1 is given by EE′′ = NR representing
the partial eﬀect [1] in equation (15a). If the second-period demand curve LM remained
unchanged (which would be the case if and only if px2 remained unchanged) the equilibrium
shifts from E to ˜ E. The resultant increase in eF1 by QR (from 01R to 01Q) corresponds to
the partial eﬀect [2] in equation (15a). In point ˜ E in Figure 1 the markets for fossil fuel are
cleared in both periods but the commodity markets are still in disequilibrium. We know
from Proposition 1 that ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0 is necessary to clear the commodity markets. As an
implication, tightening ¯ eA1 reduces px2 which, in turn, shifts downward the demand curve
LM to e.g. L′M′. The new equilibrium point is E′ and the increase NQ in eF1 involved in
9the move from ˜ E to E′ corresponds to the partial eﬀect [3] in equation (15a).15
In their ﬁrst-period production plan myopic ﬁrms in country N would have ignored
the reduction in px2. However, with their two-period planning horizon and perfect future
markets the ﬁrms in our model account for ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0 and they also anticipate the
subsequent reduction in pe1 (Hotelling rule). When the input price pe1 falls and the output
price remains constant (px1 ≡ 1), it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrms in country N to expand their
output and fossil fuel input. This is why the eﬀect [3] from (15a) works counter country
A’s cap tightening.
According to (15b) and Proposition 1 the price change ˆ px2 is the key determinant for
the green paradox because - as we have illustrated with the help of Figure 1 - it is crucial
how large the reduction in px2 must be to bring about the necessary equilibrium condition
ˆ qd = ˆ qs. To better understand the relation between ˆ px2 and ˆ qd we resort to the class of CES






































where the function Qs is implicitly determined in (19).16 The equilibrium price px2 is
uniquely determined by (23) and it obviously depends on both σ and ¯ eA1.
In Figure 2 we have plotted the graphs of Qd for alternative values of σ: σI = 0, σII = 1
and σIII very large. Figure 2 also contains the graphs of the function Qs for ¯ eA1 = ¯ e0
A1 and
for ¯ eA1 = ¯ e′
A1 < ¯ e0
A1. Starting from an initial equilibrium17 E0 and tightening the emissions
cap from ¯ e0
A1 to ¯ e′
A1 leads to new equilibria E0,EI,EII or EIII. The abscissa shows that the
lower the substitution elasticity the greater is the reduction in the price px2.
15The shift of the second-period demand curve from LM to L′M′ happens to be chosen such that carbon
leakage exactly oﬀsets country A’s emissions reduction ¯ e0
A1 − ¯ e′
A1.
16The signs of the derivatives of the function Qs are shown in the Appendix.
17We have demonstrated in (23) that the equilibrium values of px2 and q depend on the parameters ¯ eA1
and σ. The only reason for taking E0 in Figure 2 as one and the same equilibrium point for alternative
























Figure 2: Changes in px2 when the cap is tightened from ¯ e0
A1 to ¯ e′
A1 depending on the size
of σ (σI = 0, σII = 1, σIII very large)
For homothetic utility functions (not restricted to CES functions) we calculate the













N1) − γppe1eN1ηN1 > 0,




which is positive - as we already know from Proposition 1. To make further progress in
exploring the conditions for the green paradox we insert (24) into (15b) to obtain, after










N1) + π1eN1ηN1]. (25)
In (25), the term xs
A1+xs
N1 is positive and the term π1eN1ηN1 is negative. Therefore, σ = 0
implies ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0 (the green paradox occurs!) while for σ > 0 the sign of ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA1 is
ambiguous. We conclude from (25) that
ˆ eF1
ˆ ¯ eA1




N1)   −π1eN1ηN1. (26)
11Proposition 2. Suppose the utility function is homothetic and the cap ¯ eA1 is tightened.





For Leontief utility functions (σ = 0) the green paradox occurs but it does not occur in the
case of utility functions exhibiting suﬃciently large substitution elasticities. If we consider













1−η for   > 0,η  = 1,
lnxi1 + 1
1+ρ lnxi2 for η = 1,
(27)
where ρ is a positive pure rate of time preference, we ﬁnd that η = 1
σ and hence σ → ∞
if and only if η → 0. No doubt, isoelastic utility functions with η → 0 are unrealistic as
well as Leontief utility functions. Yet these polar cases are relevant in that they prove the
existence and non-existence, respectively, of the green paradox.18 The main message of
Proposition 2 in combination with Figure 2 is that the lower the substitution elasticity the
greater is the price eﬀect ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA1 and the more likely is the green paradox.
Proposition 2 focusses on the intertemporal substitution elasticity as a determinant
of the green paradox. Note, however, that the size of the threshold value ¯ σ deﬁned in
Proposition 2 also depends on the size of the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuel, ηN1,
which is entirely technology-determined. To get more information on the interaction of





it , θit ∈]0,1[ fori = A,N. (28)
For production functions (28), the equivalence (26) simpliﬁes to
ˆ eF1
ˆ ¯ eA1






From (29) we infer
Proposition 3. Suppose the utility function is homothetic, the production function
XN(eN1) from (1) is speciﬁed by (28) and the cap ¯ eA1 is tightened.
(i) Then the green paradox occurs if and only if σ   (1 − θN1) < γθ1.
(ii) The green paradox does not occur, either
(a) if pe1 ≥ π1 and σ   (1 − θN1) ≥ 1 or
18It is also worth mentioning that the condition for the green paradox does not hinge upon the pure rate
of time preference.
12(b) if pe1 ≥ π1, ¯ eA1 ≥ eN1 and σ   (1 − θN1) ≥ 1
3.






N1 − (pe1 + π1)¯ eA1 − pe1eN1,
which are positive according to (10) and (11) (and footnote 6). Using that deﬁnition of Π1
























Obviously, γθ1 < 1 if pe1 ≥ π1 and γθ1 < 1
3, if pe1 ≥ π1 and ¯ eA1 ≥ eN1.  
Proposition 3 highlights the relevance for the green paradox of the production tech-
nology in country N and period 1 and of the interaction of supply and demand conditions.
Proposition 3 conforms with our intuition that a highly elastic demand for fossil fuel in
country N is conclusive to the green paradox. That elasticity is the higher the closer to
one is the production parameter θN1, i.e. the more the production function tends to be
linear. Yet even if θN1 is small the green paradox occurs according to Proposition 3(i) if
σ is suﬃciently small. On the other hand, Proposition 3(ii) states conditions to avoid the
green paradox. Proposition 3(ii) does not imply, however, that avoiding the green paradox
requires σ > 1, because the conditions for Proposition 3ii to hold are suﬃcient but not
necessary. To sum up, according to the Propositions 2 and 3 the green paradox depends on
the order of magnitude of the parameters σ and θN1. This calls for a thorough discussion
of the empirical estimates of those parameters which is, however, beyond the scope of the
present paper.
4 Enlarging the group of abating countries
Up to now we have not made any explicit assumption about the size of the abating country
A compared to the size of the non-abating country N. We will do so now in the simplest
possible way by introducing a ﬁxed world endowment of an immobile (internationally non-
tradable) factor (e.g. land), ¯ ℓ = 1, where ℓ ∈]0,1[ and 1 − ℓ, respectively, are the inputs of
land employed in the countries A and N. To further simplify the exposition, suppose the












where θ ∈]0,1[. Note ﬁrst that in the absence of emissions capping the aggregate demand
functions for fossil fuel (in either period) are independent of ℓ. This is easily veriﬁed
13by combining (30) with the proﬁt maximizing condition Xi
eit = pt (with p1 = pe1 and














Adding up these equations shows that for any given pt the sum eAt+eNt remains unchanged
when ℓ is varied. We interpret an increase in ℓ as new countries joining the group of abating
countries which we continue to address as ”country A”. Diﬀerentiating country A’s fuel
demand function yields
ˆ pt = (ˆ ℓ − ˆ ¯ eAt)(1 − θ).
If we would increase ℓ and would keep constant the emissions cap ¯ eA1 we would combine
enlarging the group with tightening the cap for all members of the group. To avoid such
mixed strategy we will consider ˆ ℓ = ˆ ¯ eAt > 0, a scenario, that appears plausible since it
implies ˆ pe1 = 0 so that the new countries entering the abatement coalition commit to the
same constraint as the old members.


























Figure 3: Enlarging the coalition of abating countries
Figure 3 illustrates the scenario ˆ ℓ = ˆ ¯ eA1 > 0. The initial situation is as in Figure
1: AG is country A’s fuel demand curve19, ACD is the aggregate demand curve without
19For Cobb-Douglas production functions the associated demand functions are hyperbolic. For sake of
simplicity the demand curves in Figure 3 are drawn as straight lines.
14cap and ACS is the aggregate demand curve when the emissions cap ¯ e0
A1 is implemented
in country A. The line CS is constructed such that the segments ¯ e0
A1G and DS are equal
in length. With the aggregate second-period demand being LM the initial equilibrium is
assumed to be attained in point E. Suppose now country A’s demand curve shifts from AG
to AT (ˆ ℓ > 0) leaving the aggregate demand curve ACD unchanged. ˆ ℓ = ˆ ¯ eA1 is illustrated
in Figure 3 by moving from ¯ e0
A1 to ¯ e1
A1. The aggregate ﬁrst-period demand curve associated
to ¯ e1
A1 is now given by ACF where the line segment CF is constructed such that ¯ e1
A1T = DF
is satisﬁed. Since the demand curve AT is ﬂatter than AG the segment ¯ e0
A1G is smaller
than ¯ e1
A1T implying that the line CF is steeper than the line CS.
The conclusions are qualitatively similar to those we elaborated in the context of
Figure 1 and are brieﬂy summarized as follows: If the second-period aggregate demand
curve would remain unchanged (which will not be the case) one would have carbon leakage
but no green paradox. Yet px2 must shrink causing the LM curve to shift downward to
a curve such as L′M′. How far the curve LM shifts down depends on the determinants
elaborated in the previous Section 3. A green paradox occurs when the demand conditions
require a drop in the price px2 which is so strong that the second-period demand curve LM
is forced to shift below the line L′M′. Intuitively speaking, this is the less likely, however,
the steeper is the line segment CF. This line segment is the steeper, in turn, the closer
is ℓ to ℓ = 1. To see this suppose we start from the equilibrium E′ in Figure 3 (with
¯ eA1 = ¯ e1
A1) and successively raise ℓ until ℓ = 1. Since we continue to require ˆ ℓ = ˆ ¯ eA1, ℓ → 1
obviously implies ¯ e1
A1 → ¯ e2
A1 in Figure 3. When ℓ = 1 is reached the aggregate ﬁrst-period
fuel demand curve is AC¯ e2
A1. In that case no leakage occurs anymore no matter how strong
the downward shift of the curve LM may be.
ℓ = 1 means that there is a global coalition in which all countries commit to reduce
emissions. In that case our model turns out to be a very simple version of Sinn’s (2008)
model who considers a single ’aggregate’ fuel-demanding country representing the global
coalition of all fuel-demanding countries. In that case carbon leakage is trivially absent.
However, as we know from the Kyoto protocol the global coalition is far from being a
realistic scenario.
5 Tightening the emissions cap in the second period
In this section we assume that country A regulates emissions not only in the ﬁrst period,
but also in the second. The model now consists of the equations (1) - (5), (6b), (7) - (14),
and a green paradox is said to occur, if ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0 or if ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0. Let us ﬁrst consider
15the impact of ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0 and ˆ ¯ eA2 = 0:
Proposition 4.
Consider the policy ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0 and ˆ ¯ eA2 = 0 of country A. In qualitative terms, the conditions
for carbon leakage and the green paradox are the same as under the policy ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0, when
eA2 is unconstrained.
As shown in the Appendix, the only change necessary is replacing γp > 0 by ˜ γp :=
−pe2eN2ηN2 > 0. With this slight modiﬁcation the equations (15b), (24) and (25) con-
tinue to hold and hence the Propositions 1 through 3 apply.
Next, we explore the policy ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0 and ˆ ¯ eA1 = 0. The displacement eﬀects of ˆ ¯ eA2  = 0
on ˆ eF1 are formally given by
ˆ eF1eF1 =
eN1ηN1pe1¯ eA2
˜ γp − pe1ηN1eN1
ˆ ¯ eA2




˜ γp − pe1ηN1eN1
ˆ px2
      
[2]
. (31)
Proposition 5. ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0, ˆ pe1/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0 and deF1/d¯ eA2 > −1 if the utility function
is homothetic.
Proof. Contrary to the ascertion suppose that ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA2 > 0. In that case we obtain
ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA2 > 0 and ˆ eF1/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 the
last inequalities translate into (ˆ xs
A1xs
A1 + ˆ xs
N1xs
N1)/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0 and (ˆ xs
A2xs
A2 + ˆ xs
N2xs
N2)/ˆ ¯ eA2 > 0
or ˆ qs/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0. On the demand side we get ˆ qd/ˆ ¯ eA2 = σ (ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA2) > 0 for ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA2 > 0 which
implies (ˆ qs − ˆ qd)/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0. This condition contradicts the necessary equilibrium condition
(ˆ qs − ˆ qd)/ˆ ¯ eA2 = 0, which proves ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0. ˆ pe1/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0 follows from ˆ px2/ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0 and
(A54), and deF1/d¯ eA2 > −1 follows from (31).  













N1) − ˜ γppe1eN1ηN1 > 0,
˜ γp := −pe2eN2ηN2 > 0.




¯ eA2pe1eN1ηN1(1 − λ)
eF1 ˜ D












N2) ⋚ −π2eN2ηN2. (34)
Comparing (34) and (26) reveals a striking symmetry. The right side of both equivalences
diﬀers in two respects: the index 1 in (26) is replaced by the index 2 in (34) and the set of
inequalities in (26) is reversed20 in (34).
Closer inspection of (34) leads to
Proposition 6. Suppose the utility function is homothetic and the cap ¯ eA2 is tightened.





The impact of σ established in Proposition 2 is reversed in Proposition 6. More speciﬁcally,
if we tighten the ﬁrst-period cap (ˆ ¯ eA1 < 0) and either have the second-period cap constant
 
ˆ ¯ eA2 = 0
 
or do not implement a second-period cap (eA2 free) we can exclude the green
paradox for suﬃciently large values of σ. In contrast, under the policy ˆ ¯ eA2 < 0 and ˆ ¯ eA1 = 0
the green paradox is excluded for suﬃciently small values of σ.
Following the procedure in Section 3 we now invoke the parametric function (28)
again to complement our ﬁndings of Proposition 6. With the production function (28) the
equivalence (34) turns into
ˆ eF1
ˆ ¯ eA2






The information contained in (35) is summarized in
Proposition 7. Suppose the utility function is homothetic, the production function
XN(eN2) from (1) is speciﬁed by (28) and the cap ¯ eA2 is tightened.
(i) Then the green paradox occurs if and only if σ   (1 − θN2) < γθ2.
(ii) The green paradox does not occur, either
(a) if pe2 ≥ π2 and σ   (1 − θN2) ≥ 1 or
(b) if pe2 ≥ π2, ¯ eA2 ≥ eN2 and σ   (1 − θN2) ≥
1
3.
Summarizing, the impact on carbon leakage of σ and θ as established in the Propositions
2 and 3 is reversed in the Proposition 6 and 7. All parameter changes that make the green
20This reversal is exclusively due to the fact that we focus on the impact of ˆ ¯ eA2 on eF1 rather than on
eF2 (because we are interested in total emissions in period 1). If we had explored the eﬀect of ˆ ¯ eA2 on eF2
we could have simply referred to Section 3 interchanging the indexes 1 and 2 everywhere. This observation
can be easily veriﬁed by carrying out such a swap of indexes in Figure 1.
17paradox more likely when the cap is tightened in period 1 work in opposite direction when
the cap is tightened in period 2. In particular, the green paradox will likely occur when the
emissions control is strengthened in the second period, if it does not result from tightening
the emissions cap in the ﬁrst period and vice versa.21
It is informative to highlight from a diﬀerent perspective our ﬁnding that tightening
the ﬁrst-period and the second-period caps, respectively, tends to aﬀect leakage in opposite
directions. To this end suppose that a cap eﬀectively constrains the second-period emissions
in country A while ﬁrst-period emissions are unconstrained. Suppose further that analogous
to our exercise in Section 4 the coalition of abating countries becomes larger and tends
toward the global coalition (ℓ → 1). If ℓ = 1, total emissions in period 2 are strictly
capped, say at ¯ eF2. The smaller ¯ eF2 the greater are necessarily total ﬁrst-period emissions
and the more pronounced is the green paradox.
6 Concluding remarks
Following Ockham’s razor, we have abstracted from many real-world complexities such as
extending the time horizon beyond two periods, or including stock-dependent extraction
costs, capital accumulation and insecure property rights. Without doubt, all of these as-
pects are empirically relevant but they do not appear to be at the core of the green-paradox
phenomenon. To remain focused we also refrained from getting involved in the controversial
though important debate on normative ’social’ discounting, time preference and intertem-
poral inequality aversion. Our use of the demand parameters is meant to be descriptive
which does not exclude extending the analysis to normative issues, of course.
We have applied the economics of intertemporal allocation of non-renewable natural
resources in its simplest form and have been able to show how this theory drives the results.
As is well known, in a perfectly competitive world with a full set of future markets a nec-
essary equilibrium condition is that resource extracting and supplying ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
between selling the resource today or at any other period in the future (Hotelling rule in the
wide sense; here: pe1 = pe2). The requirement of clearing the market for the consumption
good in both periods combined with the Hotelling rule tends to exacerbate carbon leakage
when the ﬁrst-period emissions cap is tightened in the abating countries. An interesting re-
21This result has an important implication for policies of tightening the emissions caps in both periods
simultaneously, because the net impact on carbon leakage of simultaneous reductions in the caps of both
periods is the result of ”forces” working in opposite direction. More precisely, it can be shown that if ˆ ¯ eA1
and ˆ ¯ eA2 are tightened proportionally
 
i.e. ˆ ¯ eA1 = β ¯ eA2










then there is no impact on total emissions in period 1 at all
 
i.e. ˆ eF1
ˆ ¯ eA2 = 0 if ˆ ¯ eA1 = β ¯ eA2
¯ eA1 ˆ ¯ eA2
 
.
18sult is also that the impact of strengthened emissions control depends crucially on whether
that policy is carried out in the ﬁrst or in the second period. All determinants of carbon
leakage resulting from tightening the ﬁrst-period cap work in opposite direction when the
second-period cap is tightened. However the extent of carbon leakage is determined by the
interaction of various parameters and elasticities. Our model gives no unambiguous sup-
port to the proposition that tightening the second-period cap necessarily leads to the green
paradox and we cannot conﬁrm either that the green paradox results from tightening the
second-period cap, if and only if it does not occur when the ﬁrst-period cap is tightened.
Our analysis suggests that apart from speciﬁc characteristics of consumer preferences
and production technologies it is the general equilibrium approach in a model with a com-
plete set of perfectly competitive markets and the corresponding account of interdependence
eﬀects of markets across countries (space) and time which determines the allocation of re-
sources including the extent of carbon leakage. Such an approach is certainly satisfactory
from an intellectual viewpoint because of its consistency. However, one also needs to know
how empirically relevant it is to model economic agents and policy makers who anticipate
in their plans - and trade on - perfect markets from the presence into the far future. Ad-
dressing that issue is beyond the scope of the present paper. But as ﬁghting global change
is an urgent empirical policy issue, assessing the reliability of theoretical guidance ought to
be high on the agenda of future research, in particular, because many contributions to this
issue do not integrate their economics of global change into the established intertemporal
theory of nonrenewable resources.
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20Appendix
Emissions cap in the ﬁrst period
The competitive equilibrium of the model is characterized by the following equations
X
A
eA1 − pe1 − π1 = 0, (A1)
X
N
eN1 − pe1 = 0, (A2)
px2X
i
ei2 − pe2 = 0, i = A,N, (A3)
pe1 − pe2 = 0, (A4)
eA1 − ¯ eA1 = 0, (A5)
eFt − eAt − eNt = 0, t = 1,2, (A6)
¯ e − eF1 − eF2 = 0, (A7)
X





− pe2eA2 = 0, (A8)
X





− pe2eN2 = 0, (A9)
pe1eF1 − xF1 + pe2eF2 − px2xF2 = 0, (A10)
X
A(eA2) + X
N(eN2) − xA2 − xN2 − xF2 = 0, (A11)
Uxi2
Uxi1
− px2 = 0, i = A,F,N.(A12)
Without loss of generality good X in period t = 1 is chosen as numeraire (px1 ≡ 1). The
variables determined by (A1)-(A12) are ei1,ei2,xi1,xi2 for i = A,F,N, pe1,pe2, px2 and π1.
The emissions cap ¯ eA1 is treated here as an exogenous parameter. Total diﬀerentiation of
(A1) - (A12) yields, after some rearrangement of terms,
eA1X
A
eA1eA1ˆ eA1 − pe1ˆ pe1 − π1ˆ π1 = 0, (A13)
ˆ eN1
ˆ pe1
− ηN1 = 0, (A14)
ˆ ei2
ˆ pe2 − ˆ px2
− ηi2 = 0, i = A,N (A15)
ˆ pe1 − ˆ pe2 = 0, (A16)
ˆ eA1 − ˆ ¯ eA1 = 0, (A17)
eFtˆ eFt − eAtˆ eAt − eNtˆ eNt = 0, t = 1,2, (A18)
eF1ˆ eF1 + eF2ˆ eF2 = 0, (A19)
(X
A
eA1 − pe1)eA1ˆ eA1 − xA1ˆ xA1 − px2xA2ˆ xA2





px2ˆ px2 = 0, (A20)






px2ˆ px2 = 0, (A21)
21¯ epe1ˆ pe1 − xF1ˆ xF1 − px2xF2(ˆ xF2 + ˆ px2) = 0, (A22)
X
A
eA2eA2ˆ eA2 + X
N
eN2eN2ˆ eN2 − xA2ˆ xA2 − xN2ˆ xN2 − xF2ˆ xF2 = 0, (A23)


























  ≥ 0 for i = A,F,N.
Derivation of (15a) and (24):























where ∆xi2 := (xs
i2 − xi2) for i = A,F,N, xs
F2 ≡ 0, yi = xi1 + px2xi2 for i = A,F,N,
ei = ei1 + ei2 for i = A,N.
Making use of (A15) and (A16) in (A23), one gets
γp(ˆ px2 − ˆ pe1) = px2xA2ˆ xA2 + px2xN2ˆ xN2 + px2xF2ˆ xF2, (A28)
where γp := −pe1 (eA2ηA2 + eN2ηN2) > 0.
Inserting (A25) - (A27), (A1) in (A28) and rearranging terms yields
γxˆ px2 − γeˆ pe1 = λAeA1π1ˆ ¯ eA1, (A29)
where










xi1+px2xi2 for i = A,F,N. Solving (A18) with respect to ˆ eFt, inserting this term
in (A19) and making use of (A14) - (A17) we obtain
−(γp − pe1eN1ηN1)ˆ pe1 + γpˆ px2 = −pe1¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1. (A30)
We solve (A30) for ˆ pe1 and insert this term in ˆ eF1eF1 = ¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1 + eN1ηN1ˆ pe1 which follows
from (A14), (A17) and (A18), to obtain (15a) after some rearrangement of terms.
(A29) and (A30) jointly determine ˆ px2 and ˆ pe1. These equations read in matrix notation
 
γe −γx







−λA¯ eA1π1ˆ ¯ eA1
pe1¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1
 
. (A31)




γepe1¯ eA1 + λA¯ eA1π1(γp − pe1eN1ηN1)
D
, (A32)
where D := −γeγp + γx(γp − pe1eN1ηN1).
Lemma 1. If the utility function is homothetic, then
(i) λi =
px2
H(px2)+px2 =: λ for all i = A,F,N;
(ii) σi =
Hpx2
H(px2)px2 =: σ for all i = A,F,N;
(iii) γx = γp + λσ(xs
A1 + xs
N1) > 0;
(iv) γe = γp > 0;
(v) D = (γp − pe1eN1ηN1)λσ(xs
A1 + xs
N1) − γppe1eN1ηN1 > 0.
Proof:






(ii) Total diﬀerentiation of xi1 = H(px2)xi2 gives us ˆ xi1 =
Hpx2
H(px2)px2ˆ px2 + ˆ xi2. Comparing








= γp + λ
 
j=A,F,N






= γp + λσ
 
j=A,F,N





(iv) Making use of (A9), (A10) and (3) we obtain




= γp + px2xF2 − λ[∆xA1 + ∆xN1 + px2 (∆xA2 + ∆xN2)]
= γp + px2xF2 − λ(xF1 + px2xF2). (A34)
Inserting λ =
px2xF2
xF1+px2xF2 in (A34) establishes γe = γp.
(v) follows from using Lemma 1 (iii) and 1 (iv) in the deﬁnition of D and rearranging
terms.
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N1) + π1eN1ηN1). (A36)
The function Qs(¯ eA1,px2) and its derivatives
We start at equation (A30) which can be rearranged to
ˆ pe1 =




ˆ pe1 − ˆ px2 = ˆ pe2 − ˆ px2 =
pe1¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1 + pe1eN1ηN1ˆ px2
γp − pe1eN1ηN1
. (A38)








eitˆ eit i = A,N, t = 1,2. (A39)










eN1¯ eN1ηN1  
















pe1¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1 + pe1eN1ηN1ˆ px2
γp − pe1eN1ηN1
. (A43)

















and hence in view of (19) we get
ˆ qs
ˆ px2 < 0 and Qs
px2 < 0, respectively. To verify Qs
¯ eA1 > 0 we




px2 dpx2 + Q
s
¯ eA1d¯ eA1. (A45)
From Proposition 1 and its proof we know that
dpx2




d¯ eA1 > 0. In view of
(A45),
dqs
d¯ eA1 > 0 can only be satisﬁed for
dpx2
d¯ eA1 > 0 and Qs
px2 < 0 if Qs
¯ eA1 > 0.
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eA2 − pe2 − π2 = 0, (A46)
eA2 − ¯ eA2 = 0. (A47)




eA2ˆ eA2 − px2X
A
eA2ˆ px2 − pe2ˆ pe2 − π2ˆ π2 = 0 (A48)












eA2ˆ eA2 − xA1ˆ xA1 − px2xA2ˆ xA2





px2ˆ px2 = 0. (A50)










ˆ ¯ eA1 +
π2¯ eA2
yA
ˆ ¯ eA2, (A51)
(A26) and (A27).
Next, we insert (A15) and (A16) and (A49) in (A23) to obtain
˜ γp (ˆ px2 − ˆ pe1) + (pe2 + π2)¯ eA2ˆ ¯ eA2 = px2xA2ˆ xA2 + px2xB2ˆ xB2 + px2xF2ˆ xF2, (A52)
where ˜ γp := −eN2ηN2pe2 > 0.
Inserting (A51), (A26), (A27) in (A52) and rearranging terms we get
˜ γxˆ px2 − ˜ γeˆ pe1 = λAπ1¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1 + [λAπ2 − (pe2 + π2)]eA2ˆ ¯ eA2, (A53)
where








Solving (A18) with respect to ˆ eFt, inserting this term in (A19) and making use of (A14) -
(A17) and (A47) we obtain
−(˜ γp − pe1eN1ηN1)ˆ pe1 + ˜ γpˆ px2 = −pe1¯ eA1ˆ ¯ eA1 − pe2¯ eA2ˆ ¯ eA2. (A54)
25We solve (A54) for ˆ pe1 and insert this term into ˆ eF1eF1 = eN1ηN1ˆ pe1 to establish after some
rearrangement of terms (31).














where ˜ D := −˜ γe˜ γp+˜ γx(˜ γp−pe1eN1ηN1). Using the same arguments as in Lemma 1 one can
show that






− ˜ γppe1eN1ηN1 > 0.






















xj1 + (1 − λ)π2eN2ηN2
 
. (A58)
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